Capitalist Bulimia: Lacan on Marx and crisis by Vighi, Fabio
414 415
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
Capitalist Bulimia: 
Lacan on Marx and 
Crisis
Fabio Vighi 
Abstract: When, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Jacques 
Lacan confronted Marx’s critique of the political economy, he went 
to the heart of its most crucial notion: surplus-value. In developing 
his psychoanalytic approach, he claimed that Marx’s surplus-value 
occupies the position of the symptom/sinthome as a kernel of non 
quantifiable enjoyment (jouissance) that defies valorisation. This paper 
offers an interpretation Lacan’s discourse theory, highlighting its socially 
critical character as it appears, particularly, in the Capitalist discourse 
(the fifth discourse that subverts the structure of the previous four). It 
then focuses on Lacan’s approach to Marx’s understanding of surplus-
value, arguing that by reading surplus-value as symptom, Lacan gets to 
the heart of the enigma of the capitalist mode of production as unveiled 
by Marx. Finally, the paper examines the relevance that Lacan’s reading 
of Marx might have for the understanding of the crisis of contemporary 
capitalism and its substantial deadlock.
Key words: surplus-value, Lacan, Marx, symptom, capitalism, 
crisis, bulimia.
Introduction
There was a time when Jacques Lacan took Marx very seriously. 
So seriously that, despite not being a Marxist, he was able to think 
through some of the most crucial consequences of Marx’s insights into 
the capitalist mode of production and its reliance on the value form. 
The fact that he felt obliged, in the early 1970s, to introduce a Capitalist 
discourse in addition to the four discourses previously presented 
(Master, Hysteric, University and Analyst) is a clear sign not only of the 
sociohistorical ambition of his psychoanalytic theory, but especially 
of its critical force, where “critical” stands for unadulterated concern 
with the negative substance that inheres in, and indeed drives, the social 
formation as such. Lacan’s discourses are dialectical structures whose 
aim is to grasp the social totality in its particular historical and psychic 
configurations. Lacan’s dialectical method confronts the specificity of a 
given sociohistorical constellation by conceiving it as a totality whose 
substantial character hinges on the way it negotiates its own grounding 
impasse. 
The critical dimension of Lacan’s late-1960s discourse theory 
lies therefore in its capacity to identify a negative substantiality within 
structural relations based on the symbolic dynamism of language. 
Subject, Other, Product and Truth: these four terms sustain Lacan’s 
discourse and lend it its dialectical rigour, which incorporates negativity 
as the very engine of the discursive matrix. The Hegelian flavour of 
this relational construct is impossible to miss, for the movement and 
sustainability of the discourse itself, clad in its historical mantle, hinges 
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on the way it relates to its immanent contradiction, which is ontological 
and inerasable. Lacan’s discourse theory, in other words, provides 
glaring evidence that Lacan was a systematic thinker who held on to the 
categorial substantiality of sociohistorical formations. His “dialectics 
of misrecognition” is firmly based on a strictly speaking essentialist 
interconnection between subject and Other, two terms that can only be 
established via their interdependence: there is no subject without the 
presupposition of the Other qua functioning network of signifiers; there is 
no Other without the avowal or “libidinal investment” of the subject. What 
must be underlined is the ontological role of misrecognition within this 
relation. Ultimately, subject and Other in Lacan are fictional yet actual 
and socially binding forms of appearance. Their reciprocal mediations 
make the social discourse dialectical by attempting to negotiate the real 
gaps and inconsistencies that simultaneously sustain and disturb the 
discursive formations.
When, in the late 1960s, he took on Marx, Lacan was soon convinced 
that structural contradictions are given a precise name in his critique 
of political economy: surplus-value. In what follows I first offer a brief 
summary of my understanding of Lacan’s discourse theory, highlighting 
its socially critical character as it appears, particularly, in the Capitalist 
discourse. Then I focus on Lacan’s idiosyncratic approach to Marx’s 
notion of surplus-value, arguing that by reading surplus-value as 
symptom, Lacan provides the key to grasping the enigma of the capitalist 
mode of production as dissected by Marx. Finally, I evaluate the relevance 
that Lacan’s reading of Marx might have in relation to the ongoing crisis 
of contemporary capitalism. 
Lacan’s discourse as (negative) substance 
To understand Lacan’s Marx, we must begin from Lacan’s particular 
conceptualization of discourse as a socio-symbolic structure whose 
underlying lack (gaps, contradictions, deadlocks and so on) tends to 
be “immanently subsumed” via symptomatic formations. Insofar as it 
attempts to negotiate the structural imbalance of the discourse, the 
symptom is substantial, and as such constitutive of the dialectical 
unfolding of the discourse qua social bond. Before expanding on the 
ontological function of symptomatic formations, let us briefly unravel the 
dialectical core of Lacan’s discourse theory.
As anticipated, Lacan conceives discourse as a linguistic construct 
where subject and Other are, as it were, two sides of the same coin, so 
that neither can exist independently as an autonomous unit of sense. The 
precise constitution of this dialectical interlacing might be grasped if 
we consider Lacan’s concept of language as simultaneously subjective 
(enunciation) and objective (enunciated), to the extent that it can only 
be postulated as alienated subjectivity, as the substantial alterity that 
constitutes and emanates from any subjective stance. Insofar as it 
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carries symbolic signification, language for Lacan is an alien (other) 
force that speaks through (and takes possession of) the self to the 
point of constituting its essence – distorting any message, enjoying 
structural priority over any pretence of subjective authenticity. At the 
same time, though, it exists only for the subject, inasmuch as ‘there is no 
metalanguage’,1 no objectively functional system of signifiers that might 
guarantee faultless communication. The paradox, then, is that it is the 
substantial negativity of discourse (its ontological disjointedness) that 
decrees the symbiotic inseparability of subject and Other: as dialectically 
tied forms of appearance, subject and Other are, in Lacan, substantially 
“cracked”, and this fundamental negativity is precisely what they share, 
i.e. what makes them, in Hegelian parlance, “speculatively identical”. 
This is also why every discourse is necessarily based on misrecognition. 
Signification, and therefore communication, is by definition a delusional 
and paranoid affair, for it is ultimately predicated upon the subjective 
presupposition of the fully functional existence of the big Other, in its 
various historical manifestations. Although there is no metalanguage, 
we always secretly assume that there is one, as this belief is the very 
condition of possibility of signification. Every epistemology is thus, 
strictly speaking, fictional, a necessary fantasy based on the deceptive 
assumption of the existence of a neutral framework that a priori sanctions 
the formal possibility of knowledge. 
And yet, Lacan claims that our ultimate horizon is not the 
epistemological one. For despite its necessity, epistemological 
alienation – whereby the Other “pulls the strings” and secretly informs 
our subject-positions – can be overcome, although only by “digging 
deeper” into the empty foundations of discourse qua social substance. It 
is at this level, where alienation (the delusional strategy that “anchors” 
every subjectivity to their historical Other) turns into separation (the 
intrinsically traumatic awareness that “there is no such thing as a big 
Other”)2 that we encounter freedom as the abyssal and unbearable 
inconsistency or disjointedness of our sociohistorical discursive 
constellation. For Lacan, freedom can only be posited in correlation 
with negative substantiality: “subjective destitution”, “traversing of 
the fantasy”, i.e. radical separation from the necessity of alienation. 
In Paul Verhaeghe’s words: ‘Alienation takes the subject away from 
its being, in the direction of the Other. Separation is the opposite 
process, inasmuch as it redirects the subject towards its being, thus 
opening a possibility of escape from the all-determining alienation, 
1  This is claimed by Lacan in his texts ‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire’ 
(1960) and ‘Science and Truth’ (1965), see Lacan 2006: 671-702 and 726-745.
2  Lacan introduces the concept of separation in Seminar XI (Lacan 1998: 213-14), where 
he links it with the theme of the ‘superimposition of two lacks’ as an engendering potential. For an 
excellent analysis of alienation and separation in Lacan, see Verhaeghe 1998. 
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and even a possibility of choice, albeit a precarious one.’3 Insofar as we 
are referring to an unbearable freedom revealing the ontological gap 
within the epistemological framework that confers meaning upon our 
existence, its crucial function is, strictly speaking, revolutionary. In 
other words, freedom is the only condition that mediates the passage 
from an Other than needs to be left behind, to a different Other whose 
future consistency, inclusive of its specific symptomal “hinges”, must be 
built. Think of freedom, then, as a broken bridge between two different 
discursive shores, i.e. two different forms of sociohistorical alienation. 
The overarching Lacano-Marxian wager deployed here is that today the 
risky passage must be attempted if we are to avoid the catastrophic 
relapse into a model of social reproduction whose socioeconomic 
reliability is growing weaker and weaker.
The ambiguity of the symptom
In light of these preliminary observations, the central objective 
of Lacan’s discourse theory can be said to be the demarcation, within 
a given discursive structure, of the function of the Real of jouissance 
as the disturbing, stubbornly meaningless symptomal distortion that 
intercepts and renders phenomenologically graspable the discourse’s 
ontological deadlock. Every epistemological (discursive) order, for 
Lacan, has its symptoms, which literally embody the ontological (in)
consistency of the order itself. Put differently, the Lacanian symptom 
proper is not a signifier or a metaphor to be deciphered, but rather the 
infamous sinthome,4 a silent, repetitive, acephalous knot of jouissance 
that gives form to the discontinuity of discourse while at the same time 
guarantying its consistency – herein lies its radical ambiguity. For this 
reason Lacan’s notion of discourse is based, paraphrasing Marx, on the 
“fall of the rate of signification”, which is verifiable through the symptom. 
Every linguistic and sociohistorical bond is necessarily perforated by its 
immanent impasse, which tends to drain it of sense while simultaneously 
infusing it with desire. If the enjoyment of, or over-identification with, 
the symptom is part of a conservative scenario, where it provides the 
solution to a conflict, at the same time it can lead to liberation. To be 
able to “make sense”, the signifying chain (language, organised in 
knowledges) slides toward its entropy, i.e. a symptomatic discontinuity 
that – as Lacan put it in his 1972 Milan talk – is not merely functional to 
the conservative reproduction of that discourse, but it also leads to a 
3  Verhaeghe 1998: 180.
4  As is well known, Lacan elaborated on the sinthome in his 1975-76 seminar of the same 
name. The concept of symptom as the specific way in which the subject enjoys the unconscious, 
rather than a coded message that demands interpretation, was already introduced by Lacan in the 
early 1960s.
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réussite, to be intended as a successful “re-exit”,5 the leaving behind of 
a specific discourse in order to open up the possibility of articulating a 
different relation of signification. The unconscious enjoyment of what 
the discourse is unable to articulate – its constitutive limit – is precisely 
what ties the subject to that discourse; and yet, it also provides the 
only possible way out. Hence the fertile ambiguity of the symptom as 
a potentially destabilising deadlock. The Lacanian understanding of 
“revolution” as astronomical rotation around an axis that leads to the 
starting point,6 is predicated precisely upon the somewhat traumatic 
encounter with the otherness of the symptom.
The formalised discourses that Lacan invented in those years of 
social struggles and utopias are algebraic structures composed of four 
elements tied in a fixed relation: S1 and S2 (the signifying chain); a (the 
“remainder”, the radical alterity intercepted by jouissance); and $ (the 
subject of the unconscious, divided by jouissance and therefore pervaded 
by lack). The rotation of these elements on four fixed positions (Agent, 
Other, Product and Truth) determines four different discourses or social 
bonds (Master, University, Hysteric, Analyst), each of which, sustained 
by the alienation in/of language, has to deal with its own impasse. Such 
inconsistency can be explained as the discourse’s inability to take 
possession of an enjoyment asymptotically tending toward an impossible 
excess that, precisely because impossible, can only adumbrate its own 
emptiness. In this respect, enjoyment is the embodiment of the lack that 
opens up a fracture in the discourse, highlighting its instability, fragility 
and therefore transformability. It is precisely within this fracture that the 
symptom materialises as a “witness of truth”.
The key point that pertains to this notion of discursive structure 
is therefore the following one: the Symbolic (the “linguistic pact”, 
abstract mediation of the significations that constitute our existence), 
produces a meaningless residue, resistant to abstraction and therefore 
interpretation, that Lacan inserts in the register of the Real. As Žižek’s 
exemplary formula has it: ‘the Symbolic opens up the wound it professes 
to heal’.7 The armour of language opens up a wound that represents 
the obscure and at least minimally traumatic dimension of enjoyment – 
which, starting from Seminar XVI, Lacan names plus-de-jouir, a surplus-
enjoyment where the French plus denotes both excess and loss, thereby 
inevitably correlating to a lack-of-enjoyment. Secreted by the necessarily 
abstract (alienating) operations of language, surplus-enjoyment 
causes the continuous faltering of knowledge; at the same time, it is 
elevated to the sublime status of object-cause of inexhaustible desire. 
5  Lacan 1978: 35.
6  See for instance Lacan 2007: 55.
7  Žižek 1993: 180.
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This plus constitutive of enjoyment, then, has little to do with pleasure. 
Rather, it is a failure in the net of signifiers that constitute what Lacan 
explicitly defines ‘the market of knowledges’.8 Every society, however, 
must negotiate this residual part (which Georges Bataille, Lacan’s 
intimate friend, famously called part maudit or “accursed share”) that 
it produces and where it is secretly anchored. For this reason, Symbolic 
and Real are two sides of the same coin, dialectically inextricable. Every 
socialisation is both the cause and the effect of its own real impossibility: 
we communicate incessantly not only because we never fully understand 
each other, but more importantly because, deep down, the meaning of our 
own enunciation escapes us.
In this respect, language for Lacan is certainly a double-edge 
sword. On the one hand it carries the necessary abstraction (the vel 
or “forced choice” of alienation) that forms the basis of our subjective 
and social ontology; on the other hand, it is also the source of the 
frustrating senselessness that bedevils our existence, a profound and 
inexplicable dissatisfaction that we try to live with, more often than 
not by endeavouring to repress or deny it, attempting to overcome the 
anxiety it commands by giving in to the charms of the many objects 
of our desire. These objects parade in front of us in virtually infinite 
seriality. They can assume the consistency of a loved person, a religious 
faith, or, more appropriately for our times, the value-form that makes up 
the capitalist ether in which we are all immersed. Also for this reason, 
Lacan’s discourse theory is principally aimed at the totalising ambition of 
scientific reason informing capitalist modernity. This ambition, for Lacan, 
aims to liquidate the unconscious roots of any social ontology through the 
imposition of affirmative and self-referential knowledges, characterised 
by the ubiquitous availability of quantifiable values. It is precisely by 
articulating a critique of value sui generis that Lacan, in his discourse 
theory, could not avoid confronting Karl Marx.
The enigma of surplus-value
On May 12, 1972 Lacan held a talk at Milan University entitled 
‘On the psychoanalytic discourse’, where he introduced an enigmatic 
‘discourse of the Capitalist’ as supplement to, and subversion of, his 
discourse theory. However incomplete, his analysis clearly predicted the 
inevitable implosion of the capitalist mode of production. In Seminar XVIII 
(On a discourse that might not be a semblance), of the previous year, Lacan 
had argued that ‘underdevelopment... increasingly evident and extended... 
is the condition of capitalist progress’, suggesting that it was going to 
become fertile terrain for renewed forms of racism and segregation.9 
8  See the yet untranslated Seminar XVI (1968-69), From an Other to the other, session of 20 
November 1968.
9  See untranslated Seminar XVIII, session of 13 January 1971.
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Already from Seminar XVI, Lacan had started his original reading of what 
he regarded as the dimension of truth in Marx’s critique, focussing in 
particular on the question of the transformation of work and knowledge 
under capitalism, as well as on the central role of surplus-value within 
the capitalist social structure. These topics were further developed over 
the entire duration of Seminar XVII (The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 
1969-70). Although politically conservative and hostile to the subversive 
rhetoric of 1968, in those years Lacan was nevertheless intent on tackling 
the central concerns in Marx’s critique of capitalism. 
Crucial for Lacan’s investigation is, as anticipated, Marx’s own 
“discovery” of surplus-value, which Lacan equates to the discovery 
of the capitalist symptom: the half-open door revealing truth as the 
“impossible” of the capitalist discourse. At the start of Seminar XVI, 
Lacan proposes a homology between Marx’s surplus-value and the 
peculiar non-concept that he derives from surplus-value, namely surplus-
enjoyment (plus-de-jouir). While an analogy describes a relation based 
on similarity, a homology captures an identical mechanism within two 
different situations. And what mattered to Lacan was precisely the 
structural overlap between surplus-value and surplus-enjoyment: it is the 
same “scissor cut” at the heart of discourse, which renders legible the 
capitalist economy’s pathological dependence on its insatiable libidinal 
drive. Here, however, in order to understand how this dependence ends up 
fuelling a structural and historical crisis, we need to stress the fetishistic 
disposition of the capitalist discourse, which distorts the entropy of 
surplus-enjoyment by forcing its valorisation.
Marx himself, who had acknowledged the symptomatic ambiguity of 
surplus-value (in Capital volume 1, for instance, he refers to it as an entity 
which ‘for the capitalist, has all the charms of something created out of 
nothing’),10 ends up complying with the positivistic presupposition of its 
calculability. In underlining Marx’s ambivalence vis-à-vis his discovery, 
Lacan states, in Seminar XVII: ‘If, by means of this relentlessness to 
castrate himself that he had, he hadn’t computed this surplus jouissance, 
if he hadn’t converted it into surplus-value, in other words if he hadn’t 
founded capitalism, Marx would have realized that surplus-value is 
surplus jouissance.’ It is therefore as an attempt to free Marx from a 
Marxist tradition that “computes” surplus-value that we should read 
Lacan’s insistence on the symptomatic core of the latter, an obscure 
libidinal substance around which the entire discourse of the Capitalist 
rotates. Lacan understands that surplus-value, in the function unveiled by 
Marx, profoundly unsettles the scientific matrix that sustains and informs 
the social ontology of capitalism.
As is well known, Marx’s critique in Capital hinges on the 
connection between surplus labour and surplus-value: the “capitalist 
10  Marx 1990: 325.
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revolution” consists in the extraction of a quantity of non-remunerated 
labour that feeds into the rate of surplus-value – an “added value” 
in respect of the capital invested in the acquisition of that particular 
commodity called labour power. In turn, surplus-value transfers into the 
commodity and is realised when the commodity is sold. Ultimately, for Marx 
surplus-value corresponds to a measurable quantification of human labour 
that becomes the index of the exploitation of the worker,11 from which profit 
is squeezed out. Without the vampire-like extraction of surplus-value from 
human labour there is no way for the capitalist to make profits.
Based on Marx’s revelation – surplus-value as symptom, i.e. a 
minus (subtraction of valorised labour-power) that functions as a plus, 
accelerating the capitalist discourse – Lacan develops his homology. 
Insofar as it is necessarily mediated by labour, surplus-value is in truth 
surplus-enjoyment, an entropic and ineffable entity brought into contention 
by the signifier, which thereby sanctions that ‘there is no metalanguage’ 
– since every language and attendant knowledge is traversed and at the 
same time sustained by their own inherent lack and basic inadequacy. 
This is why surplus-enjoyment is an unconscious (live) knowledge that 
does not necessitate any “dead knowledge”, and as such it materializes 
in what Lacan, throughout Seminar XVII, calls savoir-faire: know-how or 
knowledge-at-work. Now, the great novelty brought in by capitalism and 
revealed by Marx lies not only in placing at the core of its own discourse 
the entropy of surplus-enjoyment, but more importantly in pinning on such 
surplus the mask of value. Lacan highlights the absolute ambiguity of 
the homology between the surplus of value and that of enjoyment: on the 
one hand, surplus-value is the proverbial “empty eye of the storm”, the 
intractable epicentre around which the voracious drive of the capitalist 
discourse turns; but on the other hand, it also captures the systematic 
conversion of this void into calculable value, which in psychoanalytic 
terms implies turning the object of the drive into a fetish. Following Marx’s 
lesson, Lacan fully grasps the centrality of the object-labour, defining it, in 
Seminar XVI, ‘the sacred place of this conflictual element that is the truth 
of the system’.12 What Lacan insists on is the mystification of the obscure 
meaning of the worker’s savoir-faire. At the dawn of capitalism the worker 
is robbed not only of a specific amount of surplus labour-time (abstract 
quantity of energy), but especially of his ‘knowledge-at-work’, his innate 
creative capacity by definition tied to the intervention of unconscious 
signifiers: the ‘effect of truth’ intended as a crack within knowledge.13
11  See for instance how in chapter 9 of Capital, vol. 1, Marx (1990: 320-39) attempts to measure 
the rate of surplus-value in monetary terms.
12  Seminar XVI (1968-69), From an Other to the other, lesson of 20 November 1968.
13  As Lacan put it in Seminar XVII: ‘The effect of truth is only a collapse in knowledge. It is this 
collapse that creates a production, soon to be taken up again’ (Lacan 2007: 186).
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The spurious quantification of savoir-faire (surplus-enjoyment) is 
what informs the process of capitalist valorisation and, with it, the type of 
society that such valorisation continues to reproduce. The spectral logic 
of desire is indeed closely emulated by capital, as it is often conceded. 
What needs to be remarked, however, is the fundamental distortion at 
the heart of such logic – a specific distorting operation affecting the 
most real aspect of the human condition, namely that intermittence or 
discontinuity of sense dialectically tied to the productive, expansive 
and subversive effect of truth. As we shall see below, the conversion 
of surplus-enjoyment into value feeds into the illusion of a discourse 
without semblance, i.e. liberated from castration and consigned to a 
mythical, omnipresent enjoyment. From a certain point in our history, 
the productive conflict of humanity with its own shadow matters less 
and less. Enjoyment tends to cease to appear as the perturbing effect of 
symbolic castration. Rather, such conflict is resolved by the new dogma 
of the affirmation of the value-form, which leads to the commodification 
of life in its entirety, and in particular as work. Already in Seminar XII, 
Lacan had noted how ‘an essential stage of our structure, which we call 
social but which is in reality metaphysical, in other words capitalism... is 
the accumulation of knowledge’.14 Reduced to a numerical unit as in the 
case of university credits, this knowledge becomes marketable like any 
other commodity, as Lacan will say to the students at the University of 
Vincennes (Paris VIII) in the well-known address of 3 December 1969.15
Now, it is precisely when stressing the schizophrenic character of 
the capitalist discourse – rationally devoted to the “valorisation of value” 
and animated by its mindless drive – that Lacan speaks about crisis. As 
he remarks in his Milanese talk of 1972, the discourse of the capitalist is 
‘follement astucieux, mais voué à la crevaison’,16 wildly clever, but headed 
for a blowout. Lacan’s homology, then, attempts to intercept the cause 
of the crisis of a mode of production that is extremely clever in affirming 
the logic of desire as a positive value, and yet historically exhausted, 
increasingly embarrassed vis-à-vis its own diminishing capacity to 
reproduce the social formation based on the accumulation of surplus-
value. In a context where the desiring dispositif is both fully affirmed 
and pacified in the principle of valorisation – setting up an ideological 
apparatus, commonly known as consumerism, which triumphs without 
trouble over any external opposition – Lacan speaks of a “puncture” 
(crevaison) that will stop the mad race of the well-oiled capitalist engine. 
Let us see how.
14  Untranslated Seminar XII, Crucial problems for psychoanalysis, 1964-65, session of 9 June 
1965.
15  See Lacan 2007: 197-208.
16  Lacan 1978: 48.
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The ruse called perversion 
The social link that best defines a modernity guided by scientific 
objectivity is named by Lacan ‘discourse of the University’. It emerges 
through a quarter turn anticlockwise rotation of the ‘discourse of 
the Master’ and it results in the hegemony of S2, intended as an all-
pervasive, democratically achievable knowledge that easily converts 
into information. Within a society whose dominant epistemological 
model is expert knowledge and survey-dependent decision making, the 
master-signifier (S1) – which, in Lacanian theory, fixes the otherwise 
endless shifting of the signifying chain by imposing a tautological point 
of signification – loses its direct efficacy and drops in the “underground”, 
where, as Lacan cautions, his coercive power increases as it becomes 
invisible (unconscious).
Discourse of the Master                                      
Discourse of the University
Discourse of the Capitalist
It is within the “neutral hegemony” of scientific objectivity that, 
at a certain point in modern history, the fifth discourse installs itself, 
actualising the potential contained in such hegemony. At the helm of 
the Capitalist discourse we find none other than the barred subject 
of the unconscious ($) divided by an unknown desire, and at the same 
time diabolically persuaded that he can access truth, i.e. that he knows 
exactly what he wants (as the downward vector in Lacan’s schema 
suggests). This veritable delirium of narcissistic omnipotence of the 
capitalist subject, who aspires to bypass symbolic castration and related 
jouissance (surplus-enjoyment), establishes a social ontology founded 
upon a relentless act of recycling: the transformation/distortion of a (the 
senseless residue of the signifying operation and as such object-cause 
of desire in the Master’s discourse) into a universally countable and 
exchangeable value (University and Capitalist discourses). 
If in the University discourse the attempt to totalize the field of 
knowledge encounters its limit in the production of anaemic subjectivities 
Capitalist Bulimia: Lacan on Marx and Crisis
(consumers of comfort and security, sort of Nietzschean “last men” 
desperately unable to intercept the truth of the discourse, S1 // $), 
with the advent of the capitalist nexus we experience the simulated 
potentiation of this anesthetised subject in the direction of a hyper-
narcissistic personality “without unconscious”. Born out of the inversion 
of the first couple of the Master’s discourse (S1/$), the Capitalist 
discourse revolutionises the logic of the previous four discourses, insofar 
as it attempts to transform their intrinsic impotence into the productive 
engine of sociality itself. If the Master’s discourse produced an entropic 
rest that remained unchanged, as such approachable only via desire and 
fantasy ($<>a), the capitalist revolution proposed to rationally valorise, 
produce and exchange this meaningless residue, turning it into something 
universally achievable. As aptly put by Peter Sloterdijk, at the dawn 
of the capitalist era ‘the madness of expansion [turns] into the reason 
of profit’.17 It is not accidental that the discourse of the Capitalist, as 
outlined by Lacan on the blackboard at Milan University, reproduces a 
circular, logical and seemingly uninterrupted movement among its four 
terms, one that effectively generates the symbol of infinity (∞). Herein 
then lies utopia: in the attempt to create a horizontal movement of 
perpetual acceleration fuelled by the valorisation of surplus-enjoyment. 
Realising the process of neutralisation of the other that inspires the 
University discourse, in which it germinates, capitalism at the same 
time aims to provide an answer to the empty question that echoes in 
that discourse. Its wide-open jaws require endless ingurgitation of 
surplus-value, that is to say the incessant recycling and valorisation of 
the residual excess of the symbolic intervention that, with Lacan, we call 
savoir-faire. The commodification of excess (e.g. human, domestic, toxic, 
etc. waste) is thus more than just an increasingly lucrative segment of 
our economy; it is most of all the driving force of the historical dynamic 
we call capitalism. This is true also in existential terms, at the level of 
consumption. The radical alterity of the object-cause of desire (objet a) 
morphs into the ubiquitous availability and compliance of fetish-objects 
surreptitiously invested with “libidinal superpowers”, through which the 
(perverse) subject attempts to disavow the fundamental impotence of the 
social link, inasmuch as the latter holds the key to his own identity.
This is why the epoch of capitalist globalisation is also the epoch 
of generalised perversion – to be intended in Lacanian terms not only as 
pathologically abnormal sexuality, but especially as the desperate answer 
of a historical subject increasingly weakened and anguished by the 
progressive, seemingly unstoppable waning of the “capitalist big Other”. 
The historical paradox to highlight is thus the following: perversion 
becomes a sort of spontaneous ruse aimed at negotiating the suffocating 
anxiety generated by the anaemia of a world traversed by the metaphysics 
17  Sloterdijk 2013: 84.
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of scientific objectivity. What materialises is, in fact, a vicious circle: 
the “operation recycling” that affirms the planetary hegemony of value 
out of the distortion of surplus-enjoyment, ends up recreating surplus-
enjoyment in the form of anxiety, which the subject tries to fend off by 
denying the declining efficiency of the symbolic structure. In more general 
geopolitical terms, perversion consists in disavowing the causative 
relation between the ongoing process of capitalist globalisation and the 
constant widening, at the borders of but also within urbanised areas, of 
territories populated by millions of human beings excluded from access 
to capital and thus to wealth and welfare. We are talking about a kind of 
socio-economic apartheid that might differ from its classic racist version 
in terms of magnitude, but nevertheless remains profoundly violent and 
discriminatory.
Let us recall that the secret objective of perversion, as theorised by 
Lacan, is not to transgress the law, but rather to bring back its authority, 
to the extent that it must appear inflexible and indestructible – as in 
the exemplary case of the masochist who stipulates a contract with the 
dominatrix who tortures him. Most manifestations of hyper-narcissistic 
exhibitionism that have invaded our everyday life, for instance, are 
perverse insofar as they betray the unconscious desire of subjective 
surrendering to the gaze of the Other, with the aim of securing the 
Other’s full satisfaction, consequently generating the illusion of its 
indestructibility while in turn safeguarding the ego (“they look at me, 
therefore I exist”). Offering oneself up to the Other is the most direct way 
for a subject beleaguered by anxiety to guarantee his own consistency. 
Following Freud’s breakthrough, Lacan argues that the main feature of 
the pervert is to become an instrument of the Other’s jouissance so as to 
establish or restore the Other’s authority. This goes a long way toward 
explaining why perversion is rife in times of crisis, as for instance in the 
martyrdom of the religious fundamentalist (in the name of a God whose 
authority is historically vacillating), or in the behaviour of the postmodern 
subject who, boasting a cynical distance from ideological lures, sacrifices 
all his life, body and soul, to the sacred altar of God-capital. This point 
is made by Žižek when he claims that perversion is a common feature 
of fundamentalism and western neo-liberalism insofar as it relies on 
positive knowledge rather than belief: ‘A fundamentalist does not believe, 
he knows it directly. Both liberal-sceptical cynics and fundamentalists 
share a basic underlying feature: the loss of the ability to believe in the 
proper sense of the term. What is unthinkable for them is the groundless 
decision which installs every authentic belief, a decision which cannot 
be grounded in the chain of reasons, in positive knowledge’.18  In short, 
the more symbolic efficiency declines and fragments under the heavy 
blows of an incessant, indeed global “valorisation of value” facing its 
18  Žižek 2006: 127.
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own crisis, the more the subject reacts “perversely”, immolating himself 
for the Other in the attempt to stem its draining. Differently from the 
neurotic, who endeavours to protect himself from the interference of a 
powerful law that threatens, as it were, to gobble him up, the pervert has 
to deal with a symbolic order whose fragility is so evident that it does 
not offer sufficient warranty of successful subjectivation. This is why the 
pervert cannot count on the arsenal of signifiers available to the neurotic, 
but instead tries to restore the authority of the Other libidinally, via his 
own active intervention in the Other’s breach. The pervert utilises his own 
libido precisely as a filler or stopgap, aiming to close once and for all the 
angsty chasm in the Other.
    
The nightmare of capitalist bulimia 
But let us return to Lacan’s foray into the crisis of the capitalist 
mode of production. If it is true that any capitalist society is sustained 
by the ubiquitous valorisation of what, in itself, does not count and 
cannot be counted, then why should this mechanism enter an irreversible 
historical crisis? Here it is crucial to insist on the category of the drive, 
which Lacan situates at the centre of the Capitalist discourse – just like 
Marx, incidentally, who had called capital an “automatic subject” (‘ein 
automatisches Subjekt’).19 Insofar as it is acephalous, intent on repeating 
compulsively the same circuit around the missed object – surplus-value 
– the capitalist drive is blind toward the internal mechanism concerning 
the realisation of surplus-value, which leads to the concrete production 
of wealth on which our society depends. Already in Seminar XI, Lacan 
had examined the four components of the drive as catalogued by Freud 
as pressure, aim, object, and source,20 suggesting that the drive is 
actually inhibited as to its aim (zielgehemmt), inasmuch as no object 
can satisfy it: paradoxically, the real (unconscious) aim of the drive 
is to repeat incessantly the circuit around the missed object. Now, if 
the declared object of the capitalist drive is the realisation of surplus-
value into profits, which are then reinvested into the economy (capital 
accumulation), its aim is surplus-enjoyment, that is to say the infinite 
repetition of the movement (pressure) that brings satisfaction in the 
paradoxical form of a specific type of dissatisfaction – that of never 
realising enough surplus-value. As with the smoker, the gambler, the 
drug-addict or, as we shall see, the bulimic, the capitalist’s accumulation-
related enjoyment is always partial, or else it coincides with the constant, 
compulsive deferral of full and complete satisfaction. Capital, in other 
words, coincides with its own movement of expansion.
19  Unfortunately, the English translations of Das Kapital tend to miss Marx’s dialectical point 
about capital as automatic subjectivity, translating Subjekt as “character” or otherwise (see Marx 
1990: 255).   
20  Freud 1915.
Capitalist Bulimia: Lacan on Marx and Crisis
428 429
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 3 /
Issue 3
If this is the case, then surplus-value qua object of the capitalist 
drive matters only insofar as it performs the role of the invisible 
substance that sustains the gravitational orbit of the drive itself. The 
accelerating movement of the capitalist dynamic, in other words, hinges 
on its blindness vis-à-vis its founding cause, namely surplus-value, which 
therefore functions as the unconscious object-cause of the capitalist 
drive. ‘Comme sur des roulettes’, says Lacan in 1972: the discourse 
of the Capitalist runs very fast, as if on oiled wheels, indeed it could 
not glide more smoothly, and yet… ‘it consumes itself to the point of 
consumption’ (‘ça se consomme si bien que ça se consume’).21 What this 
suggests is that the historical strength and the fundamental weakness 
of capitalism overlap as the unresolved tension between object (goal) 
and aim of its drive. The unidirectional acceleration toward accumulation 
and self-expansion works only insofar as “it does not understand” the 
mechanism that triggers such acceleration. The reason for this is that 
real accumulation is increasingly linked to what today, ironically enough, 
we call “rationalisation” (scientific management aimed at increasing 
business efficiency), namely the process conducing to the progressive 
elimination of that labour power (variable capital), which represents the 
source of capital itself, the indispensable ingredient that makes capitalist 
valorisation possible. It is in this respect that the “objective” logic of 
contemporary capitalism qua “automatic subject” can be described in 
terms of bulimia: the voracious oral drive of capital continues to ingest 
but is increasingly unable to digest, i.e. to turn the valorisation process 
into substantial wealth. The reason for this failure is that, in its current 
historical configuration, the capitalist drive ends up sabotaging beyond 
any possible repair the very cause of accumulation, namely surplus 
labour, thus feeding nothing other than its own starvation. Once a certain 
historical limit is passed, in other words, the immanent contradiction of 
the valorisation process begins to haunt capitalism, increasingly pushing 
it to realise its own self-destructive tension rather than surplus-value.
The road to accumulation is therefore a very bumpy one and 
needs to be situated in its historical context. Here, however, it is not 
enough to resurrect Marx’s old version of the “tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall (TRPF)”, expounded in Part 3 of Capital volume 3. If Marx 
was no doubt correct in observing that saving labour time through 
technological progress had to have long-time adverse consequences for 
the rate of profit,22 at the same time he did not and could not foresee the 
historically-specific, momentous impact of technological advance on 
capital’s ability to generate wealth. What is at stake today is therefore 
21  Lacan 1978: 36.
22  Marx notes that ‘this gradual growth in the constant capital, in relation to the variable, 
must necessarily result in a gradual fall in the general rate of profit, given that the rate of surplus-
value, or the level of exploitation of labour by capital, remains the same’ (Marx 1991: 318).
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not only a tendency that, as Marx himself conceded, still allowed capital 
to resort to many counterbalancing factors; rather, the current degree of 
automation of production and drastic reduction of investment in living 
labour ends up threatening a fall in the absolute mass of profit,23 as 
Marx had intuited in the ‘fragment of the machine’ in the Grundrisse.24 
If the increase in productivity through automation can be beneficial to 
individual companies, it nevertheless tends to reduce the total mass 
of value realised. In the past, this immanent contradiction only had a 
minimal impact on capitalism’s ability to produce wealth and therefore 
sustain its self-expansion, for market and production extension have 
always allowed capital to engage more human labour than the amount it 
made superfluous. Not long ago, however, we have passed the point of 
no return. We have, in other words, reached an absolute historical limit, 
whereby the compulsive pursuit of accumulation through automation 
becomes fatally and irreversibly counterproductive. Bulimia is not just 
one of the so-called new symptoms of the contemporary subject devoid of 
symbolic contents and dominated by the death drive. It is also the brutal 
manifestation of the objective impotence of the capitalist dynamic today. 
With Lacan, we could say that the capitalist project to recycle surplus-
enjoyment into surplus-value, in the context of a globally valorised 
society, fails. It is a failure incarnated in the return of surplus-enjoyment 
in the guise of a crisis by now unsustainable and inextinguishable, 
which speaks truthfully about the constitutive drive of capital, the 
“automatic subject” fundamentally blind to its own logic and aiming for 
self-destruction. This immanent limit, more antagonistic than any class 
struggle or external resistance, emerges historically at the start of the 
1970s, precisely when Lacan draws his discourse of the Capitalist in 
Milan.
If the capitalist logic is driven, this means that, in its compulsive 
self-referentiality, it is always self-identical. What changes, rather, are 
the historical circumstances in which it displays itself. In this respect, 
it is mistaken to conceive of capitalist crises as necessarily cyclical 
and immanent to the self-revolutionising dynamic of capital. This is 
true only to an extent. The Long Depression of the late 19th century 
was overcome because industrial capitalism had at its disposal new 
means and especially geographical territories for its expansion; in a 
similar vein, the crisis of the 1930s, which affected a much higher level 
of industrial production, was tamed by the new model of Keynesian 
regulation as well as the Fordist organisation of production. However, 
when this last model of capitalist accumulation imploded in the 1970s, 
the answer was a an inflationary strategy based on public credit, which 
23  This important point has been elaborated in depth by Robert Kurz (e.g. 2012), whose work is 
available in English only in fragments. For further considerations see Feldner and Vighi 2015.
24  Marx 1993: 690–712.
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opened the gates for the neo-liberal revolution while the hot potato was 
passed on to the financial markets. The cause of this latest qualitative 
leap toward neo-liberal deregulation was the so-called “third industrial 
revolution” (microelectronics), which has drastically eroded the capitalist 
potential for value accumulation in the real economy. The advent of 
microelectronics has provided capital with a huge incentive to accelerate 
the process of automation in production, which has always informed 
its principle of competition. However, as anticipated, the increased 
elimination of workforce has drastically undermined the conditions for 
real accumulation, insofar as these are dependent on the extraction of 
surplus-value through the exploitation of abstract labour (wage work). 
If this was not the case, capital would not have fled in such a massive 
and unprecedented way into the disastrous spiral of debt and attendant 
financial bubbles, where the incessant creation of substanceless 
monetary capital can only be met with the explosion of an endless series 
of crises, in a situation of general social instability that is becoming 
increasingly difficult to manage.
To conclude, let us summarise the two main points of Lacan’s 
reading of Marx. First, the centrality of surplus-value as the symptom 
where the historical dimension of the capitalist drive is anchored, 
together with the type of social reproduction it informs. Second, 
the specific pathology of contemporary capitalism as a finite socio-
historical constellation, which I have defined as bulimic. Lacan’s 
cogitations on Marx achieve a degree of intellectual lucidity that is 
rarely paralleled even in the Marxist camp. This is because, as we have 
seen, they free the notion of surplus-value from conceptual cages that 
posit its quantification and calculability. A paradoxical entity that can 
only be given as lacking, surplus-value is the “blind spot” of capitalist 
accumulation. The fact that the capitalist drive by definition misses the 
crucial function of surplus-value as the intangible hinge of the whole 
valorisation process, can only have devastating consequences today, 
when the potential for the creation of surplus-value is rapidly vanishing. 
Lacan tells us that, in its deepest connotation, the enigmatic object 
in question, the capitalist symptom, is unconscious knowledge, the 
“unknown knowledge” that moves the progress of “known knowledge” as 
real creative activity; jouissance as fertile correlative to savoir-faire. The 
type of exploitation of the worker inaugurated by capitalism, functional to 
value accumulation, corresponds primarily to this spoliation of surplus-
enjoyment as the unconscious side of knowledge. From that moment 
on, we witness a self-expansive process of accumulation whose truth 
resides in the “minimal difference” between surplus-value and surplus-
enjoyment, mehrwert and mehrlust. Žižek’s lesson on the dialectical 
significance of the parallax view is crucial here: viewed from a slightly 
changed perspective, surplus-value appears as surplus-enjoyment, 
revealing the deadlock that bedevils any economic theory based on the 
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intrinsically spurious “self-valorisation of value”. If we take Lacan’s 
reading seriously, the only way out of the current economic crisis implies 
accepting the burden of the necessary reconfiguration of the capitalist 
symptom that defines who we are. It means having the courage to leave 
behind the increasingly obsolete logic of capitalist valorisation,25 to which 
we perversely continue to sacrifice our energy despite its growing and 
irreversible sterility. It means, in short, inventing a new symptom around 
which to construct a new theory and practice of sociality.   
25  In Seminar XVII, Lacan argues that this logic also defines “really existing” socialist societies: 
‘It’s not because one nationalizes the means of production at the level of socialism in one country that 
one has thereby done away with surplus value, if one doesn’t know what it is’ (Lacan 2007: 107-108).
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